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ABSTRACT

This paper argues that ethnic status is a source of inequality conceptually independent from social class status. Many parallels exist between the development of measures and concepts for social class inequality and for ethnic inequality. Three measures of ethnic rank described in this paper correspond to dimensions of power, prestige, and wealth which have been used previously in measuring social inequality. By using three measures of ethnic rank, it is possible to compare the situation of identical ethnic groups in different countries and to compare different societies in relation to the amount of ethnic inequality within them. (1) Demographic characteristics of ethnic groups can be added to the measurement of ethnic social standing which is directly analagous to occupational prestige. These predictors estimate the social standings of ethnic groups within a particular country. (2) A power dimension can measure whether various ethnic groups are represented in institutions to the same degree that they are represented in the population served by that institution. (3) "Payoff" tables can measure the extent to which members of different ethnic groups are rewarded, either by income or occupational prestige, for equivalent performance. Finally, the amount of inequality within a society may be measured by applying an index of income inequality using the total income of each individual ethnic group. Using these measures, the authors calculate and compare social class inequality and ethnic inequality in Israel and Quebec. (KC)

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QUANTIFYING ETHNIC RANK AND ETHNIC INEQUALITY

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ABSTRACT

The development of quantitative measures of social class rank and social class inequality is briefly reviewed for comparative purposes. It is argued that ethnic status is a source of inequality conceptually independent from social class status. Three types of measures of ethnic rank are presented: Ethnic social standing scores directly analogous to occupational prestige scores; measures of the institutional power of an ethnic group; and measures derived from so-called "payoff" tables. To quantify ethnic inequality the GINI index is extended to various types of data on ethnic groups, including the ethnic-income distribution and the institutional power measures. Social class inequality and ethnic inequality are calculated and compared for Israel and Quebec.

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INTRODUCTION

Sociologists distinguish between social differentiation and social inequality. Social differentiation is based on qualities or statuses that distinguish different types of people in society, but social inequality concerns the so-called "vertical" domain of differentiation, where individuals are ranked as to the distribution of desirable but scarce resources. Most theorists accept the Weberian analysis that the vertical domain consists of differences between individuals in terms of wealth, power, and prestige (Weber, 1970). Two important bases of social inequality are social class status and ethnic status. There are good reviews of methodologies for determining social class rank and class inequality (e.g. Jackson and Curtis, 1968). This paper briefly presents methodological developments concerning ethnic rank and ethnic inequality, drawing heavily on the earlier work on social class. The aim is to devise simple measures of ethnic rank and ethnic inequality that can be used in comparative research.

Social class inequality is defined here as differences in wealth, power and prestige which originate in the placement of the individual in the economic system of society. Early definitions such as Weber's proposed the economic component of class differences as the basic source. At first, American sociologists tended to construct operationalizations of social class by a single index composed of weighted sums of various indicators such as occupation, income, education, area of residence, and so forth (e.g. Hollingshead and Redlich, 1958). Later methdologists contended that a single-factor index was obscuring differences between dependent variables and the components forming the index. As a result they broke apart the index and considered the components one by one. Of the indicators considered, only income bore a clean relationship to one of the three dimensions mentioned by Weber (that is, to the "wealth" dimension). Increasingly, however, occupation has been taken as the central measure of social class. It is closest to the "economic placement" of the individual, although all the factors generally considered usually correlate highly with each other. The increasing emphasis on occupation as the most central measure of social class was aided considerably by the development of summary measures of the "social standing" of occupations by Blishen (1967) and Duncan (Blau and Duncan, 1967).

Alongside this quantification of occupational prestige, sociologists became concerned with the amount of social class inequality in a society - the dispersion in individual scores. To this end the Gini index of inequality was developed (Alker and Russett, 1964), which can be used to compare societies as

to the amount of heterogeneity in income. These methodological developments contributed a great deal to the study of the dynamics of the class stratification system, and to research in comparative stratification.

There are many parallels between the development of concepts and measures for social class inequality and ethnic inequality. Ethnic status is defined here as an easily identifiable characteristic of the individual which implies a common cultural history with others possessing the characteristic. The most common simple indicators of ethnic status are race, ancestral country-of-origin, language, and religion.

Social class inherently implies inequality as to society's reward structure, and ethnic status only has the potential for this sort of inequality. Empirically, however, as van den Berghe has noted: "A salient aspect of multiracial societies is that racial groups are almost invariably hierarchized in terms of prestige, wealth, and power" (1967). The same is true, although perhaps less so, of ethnic groups in general (which includes racial groups but also groups with cultural histories that are identical). In presenting differences in some variable of study according to ethnic group, the cautious investigator always controls for social class differences, because of the correlation between class and ethnic status which van den Berghe observes. Social class is but one part of the vertical dimension of status--- an individual's wealth, power, and prestige -- which arises from his economic placement. We define ethnic rank as that part of the vertical dimension that arises from the cultural placement of the ethnic group to which the individual belongs.

Thus, we argue that ethnic and economic placement serve as two important sources of inequality as to power, prestige, and wealth. In some societies they may be perfectly independent -- societies where the levels of wealth, power, and prestige of each ethnic group are identical. In other societies they may be perfectly correlated -- societies with a caste system where the castes are completely defined by occupation would be a good example. In most societies the two sources of inequality will be imperfectly correlated.

MEASURES OF ETHNIC RANK

In this section we present measures of ethnic rank that correspond roughly to Weber's three dimensions of wealth, power, and prestige. The most important dimension is prestige, which is equivalent to the "cultural placement" of the ethnic groups (above), and we consider this dimension first.

Ethnic rank: the prestige dimension. The most advanced work on the cultural placement of ethnic groups is by Peter C. Pineo at McMaster University (1977). He extended the logic of the occupational prestige studies to ethnic rank by asking a national sample of Canadians to evaluate the "social standing" of various ethnic groups, as had previously been done for occupations. He scaled the responses so that each of 36 ethnic groups received a score from zero to 100, as the occupational prestige scores do. One of his conclusions was that "Canadians can rank ethnicities but that the consensus and knowledge about them are not quite so great as about occupations" (1977: 149). He further noted that the ranking itself had "few surprises," with English and French Canadians receiving the highest scores, and recent immigrant and non-white groups receiving low scores, with many well-established ethnic groups in-between.

Our purpose here is to extend Pineo's work in analogous fashion to Blishen's (1967) extension of the occupational prestige scores, and with the analogous goal: to provide a simple method for ranking all ethnic groups in any society. The survey interview on social standing is limited in the number of ethnic groups that can serve as stimulus, as was the case with occupational prestige. Thus, we search for demographic characteristics of the ethnic groups that predict their social standing with good accuracy. Then we can use those predictors to estimate the social standing of ethnic groups not included in the original survey.

At this point our methodology involved a standard regression approach. As dependent variable we used Pineo scores of social standing for the eighteen ethnic groups available on the 1971 Canadian census question on ethnicity. In Pineo's national survey the English and French Canadian samples had yielded different scores for several groups, so we considered them separately. As independent variables we considered various demographic characteristics of these groups in Toronto and Montreal, representing English and French Canada, respectively. The demographic data is available on Public Use Tapes of a 1/100 sample of the Montreal and Toronto Metropolitan areas.

The selection of independent variables for the final regression equation was performed in a semi-inductive manner. We looked for demographic indicators of several a priori dimensions. For the average social class of the group we considered the mean income of the group, the percentage of the group having white collar occupations, and the percentage of the group having over nine years of education. For indicators of "foreign-ness" or "strangeness" we considered the percentage of the group who were foreign-born, the percentage speaking neither French nor English, and the percentage having two

foreign-born parents. As a further hunch we constructed a second foreign-born variable which emphasized Quebec's special ethnic and geographic importance. For the Toronto area, persons born in Quebec were considered "foreign-born" with those born outside of Canada; for the Montreal area, persons born outside of Quebec were considered "foreign-born" with those born outside of Canada. Finally we included a racial variable in dummy form which was coded with a value of one if the group was white and zero if non-white. We performed several stepwise regressions, allowing the procedure to choose one indicator from each dimension.

It became clear from analyzing the residuals that the regression procedure always severely under-predicted the scores of the French and English groups, which led us to construct a fourth dummy variable called "charter groups," which took a value of one for the English and French Canadians, and zero for other groups. Although this variable was conceived in a wholly inductive manner, we saw with the aid of hindsight that it could apply to many other societies as well, where there is a group or groups recognized as "founders" or "charter groups:" Whites in South Africa and East European Jews in Isreal would be charter groups, for example.

The regressions were performed separately in the French (Montreal) and English (Toronto) data sets, but we discovered there was not too much difference between them, and there was a very small number of cases in each sample (eighteen identical ethnic groups with social standing scores in Montreal and Toronto). Therefore we combined the two data sets. We selected four variables which gave coefficients that were stable between the two samples, represented the four dimensions, and were powerful as predictors. The results of these analyses are presented in Table 1.

Insert Table 1 about here

The four equations in Table 1 are presented separately to allow application to other situations where there is no equivalent for the charter groups variable, or no racial differences. Income by itself predicts a social standing difference of 4 points for every 1000 dollars difference in mean income. The range in mean income for groups in Quebec is about $3000, with Native Indians at the bottom (a mean of $1800) and Jews near the top (a mean of about $4700), thus predicting a 12 point split. The foreign-born variable predicts about one social standing point difference for every three percentage points difference in the proportion of foreign-born (equation two). Being a member of one of the charter groups is worth about 28 points (equation three). Being white is worth fourteen points (equation four). These data are not a sample and thus statistical tests are of dubious importance: However, all of the regressions except for the first are strong and significant at well above the .001 level.

The coefficients in Table 1 allow us to calculate a social standing score for any ethnic group, defined by any of the various ethnic symbols, as long as we can estimate their mean income and proportion foreign-born from census or other data, and can classify them as to race and charter group status. For instance, there is a group of about 5000 Jews born in Morocco in Montreal which form a distinct ethnic group, with ethnic institutions, patterns of ethnic residential segregation, and the panoply of ethnic characteristics. This is a caucasian group with (by definition) 100% foreign-born, and their mean income is about $2500. The predicted social standing score is:

$$SS = 45.9 + .001(2500) - .11(100) + 23.6(0) - 14.0(0)$$
$$= 37.4$$

The same sort of calculation can be done for the range of ethnic definitions, such as "Lithuanians," "Protestants," or "Francophones," for example. The social standing of Moroccan-born Jews is predicted to be quite low. However, we might change the ethnic definition slightly to "Francophone Jew" to denote a slightly larger group: virtually all Moroccans in Quebec are Francophones, but the group Francophone Jew is more inclusive because it includes second generation "Morrocans" born in Quebec. The score for this group would be considerably higher. Ethnic boundaries are constantly shifting as historical conditions change, with the various diacritica of ethnic groups (such as language, religion, country-of-origin, and so forth) having more, then less, then more influence as determinants of interaction

and behavior. The point here is that the methodology for the ethnic social standing score (or "Pineo" score) is not affected by these changes.

This methodology should be generalizable to other societies, as the occupational prestige score methodology was. However, Pineo found that there is less consensus on ethnic groups' social standing in Canada than on occupations' social standing, and the difference in standing of the same ethnic groups in differenct societies will often be very great, which means that any sort of international ranking of groups would not be useful, in all probability. However, there is some possibility that the coefficients in Table 1 could be used cross-nationally to rank ethnic groups using census data from the various countries. The utility of these coefficients must await a test in cross-national research. At the very least, however, the entire methodology (including a survey with a "social standing" question, and a regression equation which accounts for the major portion of the variance in scores) is transferable to other societies, and should provide social standing scores that are comparable across societies.

Ethnic rank: the power dimension. A second measure of ethnic rank concerns the institutions controlled by the ethnic group, and is closely related to the "power" dimension of inequality. These measures are related to the ideas of "community integration" dealt with by social psychiatrists and social workers (Leighton et. al., 1963). The popular notions of "Black capitalism," and research in community power structures are relevant also (Clark, 1972). Ethnic representation on political institutions has been a frequent object of study (e.g., Brichta, 1974). Finally, the concept of "institutional completeness" of immigrant groups has been studied by Breton (1964).

Many institutions are organized publically and centrally in modern society (for instance, political and military institutions). In other cases the organization is not strictly centralized, but is such as to facilitate communication between similar types of institutions and to generate similarity among them. In capitalist societies, banks, businesses, schools, and medical institutions all have this semi-private aspect. Semi-private institutions--such as hospitals and schools -- are often set up on an ethnic basis. Measures of ethnic disadvantage which cut across public, semi-private, and private institutions are needed.

The institutional structure must be well-defined in order to construct good measures. For most institutions a hierarchy of control can be established which might be drawn schematically as a pyramid. For instance, the educational institutions in Quebec might be schematized as a pyramid with the Minister of Education at the top. Just below the top comes the Ministry of Education, then the school boards, then the school commissions, then the administrators of the individual schools, then the teachers, then the parent-teacher associations, then the students at the bottom of the pyramid who are the population served by this institution. To quantify the ethnic representation a cutting point in the institutional structure -- at some level in the pyramid -- is defined. In the political institution in Israel one might draw a cutting point just below the Knesset; in the educational system in Quebec, just below the school boards. The pyramid must include all public, semi-private, and private institutions which serve the same function. If the cutting point is very high in the institution, the analysis is similar to the study of elites (e.g., Porter, 1965).

Ethnic representation in the institutions entails a simple notion of equity: are the various ethnic groups represented in the institutions to the same degree that they are represented in the population served by the institution? If they are over-represented, then they are institutionally advantaged; if they are under-represented, they are institutionally disadvantaged. If representation is equal, the percentage of persons above the cutting point in each ethnic group should be about equal to their proportion in the population that the institution serves. A measure indicating departure from this norm can be computed by multiplying the proportion above the cutting point in a given ethnic group by the reciprocal of the proportion of the ethnic group in the general institutional population. The resulting figure is equal to one if the group is represented in the institution as in the population, less than one if the group is under-represented, and more than one if the group is over-represented. Calculations are presented in Table 2 for two institutions in Israel.

Insert Table 2 about here

In Table 2 the European groups are highest and Oriental groups lowest. The Bulgarians show values near 1.0: They are of European origin but Sephardic tradition -- in some ways, very centrally located in the social structure. These values are consistent with other evidence on ethnic rank in Israel (e.g. Weingrod, 1967).

The degree of ethnic representation will tend to become more equitable as one moves down the institutional structure. This fact is a simple consequence of the nature of the selection process. The Premier of Quebec can be none other than French Canadian -- likewise, most of his cabinet and the assembly will be French Canadian. Lower officials in government will include members of various ethnic groups, and so forth, down to potential voters, which will represent the ethnic groups perfectly. For this reason, in calculating the measures of ethnic representation it is wise to be aware of the depth at which the cutting point for the indicator has been made. In comparing institutional advantage for various groups across institutions, or in similar institutions across societies, the depth,, though arbitrary, must be approximately equal. The depth can be quantified as the proportion of the entire institution above the cutting point.

Where an ethnic group is not represented at all above a given level -- such as in the case for Israeli Moslems in the army command in Table 2 -- then it is wise to move down the institutional structure until they are represented. Moving lower down the insitutional pyramid makes the data more voluminous and more difficult to collect. If that is impossible, or if some groups are not at all represented, one can base calculations on one representative, using that as an upper limit of advantage for that group, as we have done in Table 2 for some groups.

Ethnic rank: payoff measures. A final indicator of ethnic disadvantage captures both the prestige and institutional aspects of disadvantage. It measures the degree to which members of different ethnic groups are rewarded for equivalent performance in the economic sector of society and, thus, is called the "payoff" measure.

The basic format of payoff measures is the cross-tabulation or regression of a measure of individual ability by societal reward, for the ethnic groups being compared. Measures of ability might be, for instance, the individual's intelligence or educational attainment. Measures of reward might be occupational prestige or income. Probably the most common payoff indicator is the education-by-income table.

The regression form yields a slope of income regressed on education for each group (dollars of income per year of education). Both the cross-tabulation and the regression show whether, for example, a Black person earns as much, the same, or more than a White person, at a given level of education (for an application see Siegel, 1965). Other common payoff tables are mean occupational prestige scores for given educational levels for various ethnic groups, and income per occupation tables.

These three measures of ethnic rank should correlate highly with one another, as various indicators of social class do with one another. However, they measure fundamentally different phenomena, and societies may differ as to the crystallization of ethnic rank across the measures. An entire theoretic and methodologic literature developed concerning the individual crystallization of social class rank at the level of the individual (e.g. Lensk[illegible], 1954), and similar concerns could be examined for the case of ethnic rank, except that the analysis would be on the macro-societal level. In any case, the most important causal variable is the social standing of the group, with other variables being derivative of it.

MEASURES OF HETEROGENEITY AS TO ETHNIC DISADVANTAGE

The amount of inequality in a given society can be measured by an adaptation of the GINI index of heterogeneity. Here the attempt is not to rank the groups but to measure the dispersion in ranks for a given society. The GINI index is a measure of heterogeneity based on a cumulative distribution, and has a history of use in economics and demography (Alker and Russett, 1964). It has been widely used to measure income inequality (Lorenz, 1905). Since income is one good measure of social class, the GINI index of income inequality is an indicator of class inequality.

For ethnic inequality, several variations can be used. The simplest is a measure of income inequality where the total income of each ethnic group is considered instead of the individual income. The "x" axis has the ethnic groups along it, measuring their cumulative proportion of the total population. The order of the ethnic groups on the "x" axis is determined by their average income. The "y" axis has the cumulative proportion of the total income earned by each ethnic group. If there is no inequality, each ethnic group should have the proportion of the total income equivalent to their proportion of the population, giving a straight diagonal line. The poorer ethnic groups have greater proportion of population than income, yielding a departure from the diagonal. The line of departure is called the Lorenz

curve, and the area between the Lorenz curve and the line of equality is measured by the GINI index (Figure 1). Calculation of the GINI index has been described elswhere (Shyrock and Siegel, 1973: 178-180).

Insert Figure 1 about here

The GINI index of inequality has also been applied to political representation by geographic areas, and is easily extended to institutional representation by ethnic group. Here the "x" axis is again measuring the proportion of the total population served by the institution that the ethnic group has, but the groups are in order by their degree of representation in the institution. The "y" axis has the proportion of ethnic members above a given cutting point in the institution. Again, the population proportion of the ethnic groups usually outpaces their institutional representation, giving a Lorenz curve from which a GINI index can be calculated. We have calculated the GINI indices for representation in the Knesset and in the army in Israel, and these figures are given at the bottom of Table 2.

The GINI index of ethnic-income inequality described above is constrained to be equal to or smaller than the simple GINI index of income inequality in the same society. How much smaller depends on the specific nature of the aggregation of individual incomes into ethnic categories. In societies with a great deal of income inequality, the ethnic-income inequality can be high or low: the two dimensions are conceptually independent and can reflect different social structures and processes. We have calculated values for income and ethnic-income inequality for Quebec and Israel, using the eleven largest ethnic groups in each society, and a similar income distribution for employed males in each case. The relevant Lorenz curves are in Figure 1. The index of income inequality for Quebec is .36, noticeably higher than for Israel, with a value of .28. But the ethnic- income inequality is higher in Israel (.10 versus .06 for Quebec). The importance of the size of these differences is difficult to judge. The differences between Quebec and Israel barely show on the scale in Figure 1: But the relative differences are fairly large-Israel's ethnic inequality is nearly twice that of Quebec's while its income inequality is about 20% less than Quebec's. These differences reflect correctly on the nature of the two societies: The tax and welfare

structure in Israel restricts income inequality much more severely than in Quebec, but for various historical reasons ethnic inequality is much greater in Israel.

These measures should prove valuable in comparative research in ethnic stratification. Comparative studies in ethnic stratification in the past have been qualitative for the most part. Now, however, it should be possible to compare the situation of identical groups in different societies, as well as to compare different societies as to the amount of ethnic inequality that exists.

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TABLE 1

REGRESSION OF SELECTED DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS WITH PINEO'S SCORES OF SOCIAL STANDING FOR EIGHTEEN ETHNIC GROUPS IN MONTREAL AND TORONTO

	Regression coefficients for regression equation number:			
	1	2	3	4
Intercept	29.5	41.3	27.7	45.9
Mean Income	.004	.006	.005	.001
Proportion Foreign-born*		-.35	-.08	-.11
Charter Groups**			28.6	23.6
Race***				-14.0
Uncorrected Multiple R	.26	.55	.80	.88

* This variable considers Quebec-born as foreign for the Toronto data-set, and those born outside Quebec as foreign for the Quebec data set.

** This variable assigns a zero to all groups except the French and English Canadians, which receive a value of one.

*** This variable assigns a zero to White groups and a one to non-White groups.

TABLE 2

INDICES OF INSTITUTIONAL ADVANTAGE OF TEN ETHNIC GROUPS IN ISRAEL

Group	Institution			
	Knesset		Army Command	
	Number	Index	Number	Index
Israel-born	41	4.6	46	1.4
German-Austrian	7	1.9	4	2.9
Polish	32	2.3	12	2.2
Russian	12	1.8	7	2.7
Romanian	3	0.3	3	.6
Bulgarian	1	0.4	1	.9
Iraqui	3	0.3	0	(<.3)
Moroccan	5	0.3	1	.2
Yemenite	1	0.2	0	(<.7)
Moslem	6	0.3	0	(<.1)
GINI Index		.52		.66

FIGURE 1

Income and Ethnic-income Inequality
in Quebec and Israel